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F
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
_

_

_

_

_

UA~H
1• • ,

/

1qrr

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

ROGER ANDERSON and THOMAS
E. BRACKENBURY,
Defendants and Appellants:

Case No. 16372

PETITIONER, Roger N. Anderson, by and through his attorney,
S. Rex Lewis of Howard, Lewis & Petersen, and pursuant to Rule
76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions this
Court for rehearing in the above-entitled matter.

Petitioner

respectfully suggests that the Court erred in the following
particulars:
1.

The Court did not apply the proper standard in deter-

mining the prejudice to petitioner of the lower court's constitutional error.

Past decisions of this Court and the United

States Supreme Court require that the beneficiary of constitutional error demonstrate the harmlessness of such error beyond
a reasonable doubt.

The State failed to meet that burden in this

case and petitioner's conviction, therefore, must be reversed.
2.

The Court improperly considered the so-called "false

statements" of the allegedly tampered-with witness in its determination that the State had surmounted its burden at the preliminary hearing.

The Court condemned the use, at the prelim-
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inary hearing, of the hearsay affidavit of Ray Applegate, the
State's only material witness, but concluded that in this case
any error on the part of the lower court in admitting such an
affidavit was "harmless" or "nonprejudicial" to petitioner
because the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, when
considered together with Applegate's "false statements," was
sufficient to surmount the State's burden at the hearing.
Petitioner urges that the "false statements" proffered by the
State could not be considered by the lower court because they
were not only unsworn hearsay, already condemned by the court's
original opinion, but also because without the constitutionally
condemned affidavit, they were supported by no evidentiary
foundation.
3.

The Court should consider the arguments of petitioner

with respect to the constitutionality and proper interpretation
of Utah Code Annotated §76-8-508, the Code section for the
violation of which petitioner was charged and convicted.
arguments were originally dismissed without analysis.

Such

This

section of the Code has not been carefully and analytically
interpreted by the Court, and the arguments of petitioner and
the state present the Court with an opportunity to clarify
existing inherent ambiguities with respect to the proper interpretation of that section.

authoriJ

Petitioner Roger N. Anderson's Brief on Rehearing accompanie
this Petition and supports the same with points and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

Petitioner requests that his Petition for Rehearing be granted.
DATED this 2nd day of July, 1980.

MAILED a copy of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing to
Robert Hansen and Earl F. Dorius, Utah Attorney General's Office,
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 2nd day of
July, 1980.

'iJ4/(1%~
S CRETARY

\

~

.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 16,372

ROGER ANDERSON and THOMAS E.
BRACKENBURY,
Defendants-Appellants.
PETITIONER ROGER N. ANDERSON'S BRIEF
ON REHEARING
INTRODUCTION
On May 29, 1980,

in an opinion authored by Justice Richard

i'laughan, this Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Roger
N. Anderson (hereinafter, "petitioner") on the charge of tampering
with a witness in violation of Utah Code Annotated (U.C.A.) §76-8508. The conviction on the same charge of petitioner's original
co-appellant, Thomas E. Brackenbury, was reversed on the basis
that the latter had been granted immunity.
The majority opinion carefully treated a single issue raised
in petitioner's original brief on appeal: whether appellants had
been denied a fair preliminary hearing in view of the lower court's
admission of certain hearsay evidence in the form of an affidavit
of a material witness, not present at the hearing.

This Court

concluded that the lower court's decision to admit the hearsay
evidence impinged upon appellants' fundamental, constitutional
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary
l1ear:-ing.

(Maj. op. at 11.)

The Cour:-t concluded, however, that any
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prejudice resulting from the lower court's constitutional errc
was harmless to appellants.

(Maj. op. at 12.)

A copy of ~er

opinion is set forth in Appendix "A" of this petition.
Respectfully, petitioner requests this Court to reconsid"
its determination that any prejudice on the part of the lower
court's error was "harmless" with respect to this petitioner.
Further, petitioner requests this Court to consider and resolve
those substantial issues raised in petitioner's original brief
appeal, which were summarily dismissed by the majority without
any consideration or analysis.

Upon reconsideration,

petit~M

respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ERROR OF THE LOWER COURT IN ADMITTING HEARSAY EVIDENCE'
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE D~
AND PETITIONER'S CONVICTION, THEREFORE, MUST BE REVERSED.
The majority opinion leaves no doubt as to the verity and
damental nature of the following propositions.

First, an accu•

enjoys a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing.

~

Freeman, 93 Utah 125, 71 P. 2d 196, 199 (1937); Utah Constituti·
Article I, § 13.

Second, the preliminary hearing is an integr

part of a "criminal prosecution,"

(see maj. op. at 5) and beca.

it is an adversarial proceeding, "certain procedural safeguad'
are recognized as necessary to guarantee the accused's~
right to a fair hearing."

(Id., at 7.)

(Emphasis added.)

the fundamental purpose of a preliminary hearing is to ferret
"groundless and improvident prosecutions."

( Id . , at 7 . )

ancillary purposes of the hearing include:

( 1) to effective'
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Foe:

advise defendant of the nature of the charges against him; (2) to
provide defendant with a means of effectuating discovery through the
uncovering and preservation of favorable evidence in his behalf; and
(1) to aid defendant in preparation of his defense for the subsequent trial.

(_!i, at 8.)

The majority recognized the crucial inter-

play between a fair preliminary hearing and a fair trial:
(t]he discovery available at the preliminary hearing represents
an important step in the preparation of the defendant's defense
for the subsequent trial.
The opportunity to prepare an effective defense is recognized as essential to the preservation of
the defendant's substantive right to a fair trial. Thus, here
again, effectuation of the ancillary purposes of the preliminary
hearing mandates the application of certain procedual safeguards
to the hearing itself.
[Footnotes omitted.]

_!j_, at 8-9. (Emphasis added.)
Fifth, the majority, after analyzing the interrelationship
of the rights of confrontation of witnesses, assistance of counsel,
and presentation of a defense, concluded that these rights must be
guaranteed at the preliminary hearing.

{Id., at 10.)

Finally, the majority, in analyzing the scope of defendant's
right of confrontation of witnesses, specifically held that such
substantive right includes "the procedural right of cross-examination,"
(id., at 10) and concluded that cross-examination is "essential to the
preservation of a fair hearing" and hence, a fair trial.
11.)

(Id. at

(Emphasis added.)
With the foregoing propositions, and the policy and constitu-

tional considerations supporting them, petitioner completely agrees.
Petitioner cannot agree with this Court's conclusion, however,
that the lower court's denial of petitioner's constitutional right
to cross-examine the State's only material witness at the preliminary hearing constituted harmless

erro~

for two reasons.
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A.

Before constitutional error can be held harmless, it
must be determined to be harm less beyond are,-isor1abfe
doubt.
----

At stake here i.s petitioner's constitutional right to crossexamine witnesses at the preliminary hearing.
importantly,

Perhaps even more

because of the interplay between a fair preliminacy

hearing and a fair trial, petitioner's constitutional rights to
prepare and present a meaningful defense at a fair trial are alsJ
in issue.

The lower court's interpretation of U.C.A. §77-15-19

completely denied petitioner these rights.

The narrow question

here, then, is whether the denial of these constitutional rights
prejudiced petitioner.
In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Erl.
705 (1967), the United States Supreme Court announced the standat
for determining whether constitutional error should be considered
harmless or prejudicial:
In fashioning a harmless-constitutional-error rule, ~
must recognize that harmless-error rules can work very mi~
chievous results when, for example, highly important and per·
suasive evidence, or argument, though legally forbidden, fini
its way into a trial in which the question of guilt or innocence is a close one.
What harmless-error rules all aim at
is a rule that will save the good in harmless-error practice•
while avoiding the bad, so far as possible.
We prefer the approach of thi.s Court in deciding what
was harmless error in our recent case of Fahy v. State of
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171. The:
we said:
"The question is whether there i.s a reasonable Pil_'.'..
bility that the evidence complained of might have contri~
the conviction."
Id., at 86-87, 84 s.ct. at 230 . • . . Att
same time, however, like the federal harmless-error statu~.
it emphasizes an intention not to treat as harmless those
constitutional errors that "affect substantial rights" of a
party • • • • Certainly error, constitutional error, ~
admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, c1~
someone other than the person prejudiced by it a bm·den to
show that it was harmless.
It is for that reason that the
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origi~al common-law harmless-error rule put the burden on

the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was
no_ injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obta.i.ned
judgment.
There is little, if any, difference between our
Statement in Fahy v. State of Connecticut about "whether
there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained
of might have contributed to the conviction" and requiring
the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.
[Footnotes omitted.)
Id., 386 U.S. at 22-24, 87 S.Ct. at 827-28. (Emphasis added.)
This standard is virtually universal.
~mbers

This Court, and its

individually, in majority, dissenting and concurring opin-

ions have both implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the applicability of this standard of review in cases involving constitutional
error under either the federal or state constitution.

State v.

Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1979); State v. Sandoval, 590 P.2d
346, 348 (Utah 1979)
572 P.2d 343,

(Wilkens, J. dissenting); State

v. Codianna,

249 (Utah 1977); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338,

1356 (Utah 1977)

(Crockett, J., concurring); State v. Eaton, 569

P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah 1977); State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466, 469
(Utah 1975); State v. Kazda, 540 P. 2d 949, 951-953 (Utah 1975)
(Maughan, J., concurring); State v. Jordan, 26 Utah2d 240, 487
P.2d 1281, 1287 (1971)

(Callister, C.J., dissenting); State v.

Scandrett, 24 Utah2d 202, 468 P. 2d 639, 643 (1970); and, State v.
Martinez,

23 Utah2d 62, 457 P. 2d 613, 614 (1969).

As this Court stated in State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah2d 202,
468 P. 2d 639 ( 1970):
There are two differing views as to the effect of error
in violating a constitutional right.
On the one hand it is
sometimes stated that the violation of such a right should be
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deemed prejudicia~ per se; and on the.other, that it may
depend upon the c1rcumstances.
The f1rst proposition hac
the frailty of most generalities.
Simply that it is nM,
universally true.
There are certainly conceivable circ~rn
stances where the violation of a constitutional right cou'
have no possible bearing upon any unfairness or: irnpositio.·
upon the defendant, or upon a cor-rect determL,cition of hi·,
or innocence.
We think the correct view, and the one whi;
is both practical and in keeping with. the desired objecti•
of fundamental fairness and due process of law, is that tn,
is a presumption that such error is prejudicial, but that,can be overcome when the court is convinced beyond a rea\O:'
able doubt that it had no such prejudicial effect upon t~
proceedings.
Id., 468 P.2d at 643.

(Emphasis added.)

P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1978)

See Also, State v. Lee.,

(Wilkens, J., dissenting); State v. Tic.,

584 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah 1978)

(Wilkens, J., dissenting); andSt·

Hodges, 30 Utah2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322, 1323-24 (1974).
Critical constitutional rights are at stake in this

ca~.

Egregious error was committed below which effectively denied
petitioner his rights of confrontation, preparation of defense,
and fair trial.

The standard is clear.

error beloW" was prej ud ic.ial,

It is presumed that t:.

(Chapman, supra, and Scandrett, !,

and the burden is on the beneficiary of the error (the State)'.
show that such was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
supra, 386

u. s.

at 24.

Chapmar

Because the State did not meet its buri

the cause must be reversed.

(The majority opinion, in support

of its holding that petitioner was not prejudiced in this case
the lower court's constitutional error, relied upon State v.
Hamilton, 18 Utah2d 234, 419 P.2d 770 (1966).

Hamilton pr~~

Chapman and the Utah cases cited above which have adopted the
dard and rationale announced in Chapman.

To the extent that
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Scandrett and Chapman are inconsistent with Hamilton, petitioner
suggests that the latter must be deemed to have been overruled sub
silentio.)
B.

Under any standard of review, the lower court's error
was prejudicial, and, therefore, warrants reversal.

The majority opinion carefully stated the burden the State
must bear at the preliminary hearing:
Preliminary examinations in Utah are adversarial proceedings in which the prosecution must present evidence
sufficient to establish: (1) that a public offense has been
committed, and (2) sufficient cause to believe the defendant
guilty thereof.

*

* *

Conversely the probable cause showing at the prelimiany examination must establish a prima facie case against
the defendant from which the trier of fact could conclude
the defendant was guilty of the offense as charged.
The prosecution is not required to introduce enough evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, but must present a quantum of evidence sufficient to
warrant submission of the case of the trier of fact. [Footnotes
omitted.)
(Maj. op. at 5-6.)

(Emphasis added.)

Thus, prosecution must present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case and to warrant submission of the case to
the trier of fact.

If the prosecution fails this burden, defendant

cannot be bound over for trial without denial of his constitutional
rights enumerated above.

Such error, in binding defendant over

for trial despite the failure of the prosecution to sustain its
burden at the hearing, would always be inherently prejudicial.
Defendant would be bound over for trial without an adequate preliminary hearing, and because of the interplay between a fair hearing
and a fair trial, the denial of a constitutionally acceptable hearing
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would operate as a denial of a fair trial.
The record clearly establishes that the State failed to
its burden at the preliminary hearing in this case.
Danker, 599 P.2d 518,

In

~
esta~

519 (Utah 1979) this Court clearly

lished the elements of the crime of witness tampering:

llle?t

( 1) de-

fendant must know an "official investigation" is "in progress";
(2) he must know that the person allegedly tampered with has
been or will be designated as a "witness" in the official investigation; and (3) he must induce or cause the "witness" to
or "inform" falsely.

"testi~

To meet its burden of establishing a prima

facie case at the preliminary hearing, the prosecution had to
present evidence as to each of these elements.
Only two wi.tnesses--James Garner and Irvine J. Curtis--were
present and testified at the preliminary hearing.
missible evidence was thereat presented.
direct testimony was extremely brief.

No other ad-

James Garner's

He merely reported

was the owner of a saloon in Soldier Summit, that on the

that~

eveni~

of May 28, 1978, he was involved in an altercation with petitioner, and that, as a result of the altercation, he was arrested,
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 34-35.)

Garner did not give

testimony as to any of the elements of the crime of witness tampering, i.e., that petitioner believed an official investigation
had been instituted, that petitioner knew that Ray Applegate

(th'

alleged victim) had been designated as a "witness" in the offici'
investigation, and, most importantly, that petitioner induced or
otherwise cause Applegate to testify or inform falsely.
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Irvine J. Curtis' testimony was also brief.

Curtis testified

that on the night in question, he formally placed James Garner
under arrest and transported him to the Utah County Jail.
at 36-37.)

(Id.,

Curtis also testified with respect to two conversations

he had conducted with petitioner concerning written statements
secured by petitioner from Applegate.

(Id., at 38-40.)

Curtis

had never actually seen the statements, and his testimony was not
used to lay a foundation for their admission into evidence.
though,

Al-

based upon Curtis' testimony, the lower court could have

surmised that Applegate's statements were taken with some force,
Curtis did not testify as to the key element of the crime of
witness tampering, i.e., that petitioner induced or otherwise
caused Applegate to testify or inform falsely.

That petitioner

may have used some force in securing the statements is not ipso
facto prima facie evidence as to the falsity of the same.

More-

over, Curtis' testimony did not offer prima facie evidence with
respect to the other elements of the crime.

Thus, the testimony

of these two witnesses, standing alone, was wholly incapable of
satifsying the burden of the State to present a prima facie case
with respect to petitioner's guilt of the crime charged.
With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence presented
at the preliminary hearing by the prosecution, the Court noted
in its May 29 opinion:
[w)e must turn now to determine the effect of this
holding in the present case. Although the judge's interpretation of the statute and his acceptance of th7 h7a:say
evidence constitute error, that error was not preJudicial to
the defendants.
Rather, in this case, the error was rendered
harmless by the testimony of the other witnesses at the hearing.
Their testimony, when considered in conjunction with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the copies of the false statements signed by Applegate f
were presented at the hearing, was sufficient t~'
the prosecution's burden and establish sufficient caus/ •.
bind the matter over to trial.
·
(Maj. op. at 12.)

(Emphasis added.)

The testimony of Curtis and Garner, only when considerec.
conjunction with the "false statements" signed by Applegate,,,,
held to be sufficient to surmount the State's burden at the h0:
ing.

Petitioner agrees with the Court's conclusion that

~e ~

mony of Garner and Curtis, standing alone, was insufficient to·.
the State's burden, but petitioner believes the Court erred in
concluding that the "false statements" made by Applegate could
t~

used to fill the gaps of the State's burden resulting from
inadequate testimony of Garner and Curtis.

Two reasons suppoc

petitioner's conclusion.
First, because the "false statements" of Applegate were a
ted as part and parcel of the tainted hearsay affidavit alreac
demned by this Court, such statements were likewise tainted a:,
inadmissible.

At the preliminary hearing, after the testimon)

Garner and Curtis, the prosecution proffered the affidavit of
Applegate, together with the so-called "false statements."
liminary Hearing Transcript at 43.)

This Court has

(F:

already~

demned the admission of the sworn affidavit as a violation of
petitioner's constitutional rights.

~fortiori,

under theser

cumstances, the admission of the unsworn "false statements"~
made by Applegate, violated petitioner's constitutional right·
Second, no foundation for the admission of the "false'~
ments" was laid at the hearing, and without the condemned at:
the statements were inadmissible.

No testimony was introd
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the preliminary hearing by way of foundation for the so-called
"false statements" of Ray Applegate.

None of the witnesses at the

hearing had ever seen the statements, and no testimony was given
with respect to their authenticity, truth or falsity, or chain of
custody.

Although the statements possibly could have been admitted

with proper foundation had the admission of Applegate's affidavit
not violated petitioner's constitutional rights, nevertheless,
because this Court has concluded that the affidavit was improperly
used, no other evidentiary foundation justified the admission of
the statements.

Finally, the prosecution attempted to justify the

admission of the "false statements" with the claim that such had been
made a part of the depositions of George Schade, Mayor of Soldier
Summit, and Thomas Brackenbury, petitioner's original co-appellant.
Such attempted justification is without merit for two reasons.
First, the depositions of Schade and Brackenbury were never
published in the record, or otherwise admitted into evidence at
the preliminary hearing.

Schade had not been charged in this case,

and Brackenbury's deposition was not formally used by the prosecution at the preliminary hearing.

Second, evidence given by

Brackenbury, who had been granted immunity by the prosecution,
could not constitutionally be used against Anderson unless Brackenbury
testified and was subject to cross-examination at the hearing.
(Maj. op. at 10-11.)

See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.

123, 134-137, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 467 (1968) and Robert v.
~ussell,

392 U.S.

293, 294, 88 S.Ct. 1921, 20 L.Ed.2d llOO (1968).

Because Brackenbury did not testify thereat,

the so-called "false-

statements" made by Applegate and found in Brackenbury' s deposi ti.on·
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could not be admitted into evidence against Anderson for purp 0 ,,
of fulfilling the State's burden at the hearing.
In short, only the constitutionally unacceptable hearsay,
erroneously admitted by the lower court, could have served as
sufficient evidence to establish the requisite prima faci_e casP,
justifying petitioner's being bound over for trial.

At a pre-

liminary he-aring on the charge of witness tampering, only the
person allegedly tampered with possesses sufficient personal
knowledge to establish a prima facie case against the defendant.
Thus, Applegate' s absence from the preliminary examination prevented the State from meeting its burden of establishing a

pri~

facie case against petitioner and therefore, petitioner was
wrongfully tried.

The State attempted to rely upon a hearsay

affidavit of the only material witness against petitioner, Ray
Applegate.

This Court has already condemned the error in ad-

mitting such hearsay.

The prejudice is inherent.

But for the

tainted evidence, petitioner would never have been bound over
for trial.

(That petitioner was ultimately convicted as charged,

is no retroactive justification for the denial of his rights W
confront and cross-examine witnesses and to receive a fair hearir
and trial.)
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER PETITIONER'S OTHER ARGUMENTS
RAISED IN HIS INITIAL BRIEF ON APPEAL.
The May 29, 1980 opinion of the Court analyzed and resolv~
two of the issues petitioner raised in his initial brief on

ap~

In addition to the preliminary hearing question, the majority c
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sidered and resolved the issue of whether petitioner's original
co-appellant, Thomas E. Brackenbury, had been granted immunity by
lhP Wasatch County Attorney.

The majority did not resolve three

other issues raised by petitioner in his original brief on appeal.
Petitioner respectfully requests the Court to consider these issues
Jnd resolve the same in favor of reversal of petitioner's conviction.
The issues initially raised by petitioner, but left unresolved
by the Court,

essentially all concern the interpretation of U.C.A.

§76-8-508, the criminal code section for the violation of which
petitioner was originally convicted.

This Court has previously

considered U.C.A. §76-8-508 only once.
P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1979).

See, State v. Danker, 599

Danker did not involve an attempt by

defendant to induce or cause a person to testify or inform falsely.
Rather, Danker involved the defendant's attempt to withhold testimony
or information.

In Danker, no apparent challenge was made to U.C.A.

§76-8-508 on constitutional grounds, as here.

Further, defendant's

primary arguments in Danker dealt not with the interpretation of
U.C.A. §76-8-508, but with challenges to the lower court's evidentiary rulings.

Thus, this section of the Code has not been analy-

tically and carefully interpreted by the Court.
One of the fundamental precepts upon which American government is founded is the rule of law.
of law is clarity and certainty.

Part and parcel of the rule

When a law is vague and over-

broad, arbitrariness and caprice reign, not clarity and certainty,
,111d

the rule of law is thereby undermined.

Petitioner originally

Jrgued on appeal that U.C.A. §76-8-508 was unconstitutionally
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vague and overbroad and that petitioner could not be <JL:ilty
offense embodied therein as a matter of law.

or

t>

Both arguments nee,

sitate an interpretation of §76-8-508; both concern pronounced
ambiguities in that section as it currently reads.
The State vigorously controverts petitioner's arguments wit::
respect to the interpretation and constitutionality of §76-8-508.
With both sides of the issues so actively contested and forceful:
presented, there is little reason to dismiss them without analysi'
It is petitioner's position that ambiguities and overbreadth are
inherent in §76-8-508; these issues will be repeatedly raised

~

other appellants until they are resolved.

~

Such issues should

considered on rehearing.
CONCLUSION
Roger N. Anderson respectfully requests the Court to reverSt
his conviction on the ground that the State failed to meet its b.·
den of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt,

the harmlessness

and non-prejudicial nature of the clear, constitutional error of
the lower court in denying him his constitutional rights to

~~

front and cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary hearing,

~

receive a fundamentally fair preliminary hearing, and to prepare
an adequate defense for a fair trial.
Petitioner further requests this Court to grant his petitio:
for rehearing to consider the constitutionality and proper in~~
pretation of U.C.A. §76-8-508.
Respectfully submitted this __12tday of

July

, 1980.

1/';,>

--.~

1.--:/, ,_

//

/

-c

S •:,REX LEWI-5 .
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RECEIVED

-----00000----1 ;_., (

The State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

·J

U

1980

No. 16372

t-:OWARD LEWIS & PETERS>
F I L E D
May 29, 1980

Roger Anderson and Thomas
E. Brackenbury,
Defendants and Appellants.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

MAUGHAN, Justice:
The defendants, Roger Anderson and Thomas Brackenury, bring this appeal from their conviction for tampering
with a witness in violation of 76-8-508. We uphold the
conviction of Roger Anderson, hereinafter "Anderson," but
set aside the conviction of Thomas Brackenbury, hereinafter
"Brackenbury.-" All statutory references are to Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended.
The factual basis of the jury conviction is relatively simple. The defendants, Anderson and Brackenbury,
entered the J & M Saloon, located in Soldiers Summit, Utah,
to investigate suspected illegal sale of alcohol. At the
time of the incident in question, Anderson was the Chief of
Police of Soldiers Summit and Brackenbury was the Justice of
the Peace.
In the saloon a confrontation ensued between
Anderson and the manager of the saloon, James Garner, hereinafter "Garner." During the confrontation a patron of the
saloon, Ray Applegate, hereinafter "Applegate," came to the
aid of Garner, who referred to him as his bouncer. However, Applegate testified at trial that upon being informed
Anderson was the Chief of Police he returned to his original
place at the other end of the bar.
The escalating confrontation ended when Garner
struck Anderson in the face.
Anderson announced that Garner
was under arrest and, although emotionally distraught, left·
the saloon to enjoin the aid of the police officer then on
duty before taking Garner into custody. Once out of the
saloon Brackenbury left Anderson and returned to his trailer.
Upon enlisting the aid of Officer Butch Curtis, hereinafter "Curtis," Anderson, who was still quite excited from
the earlier controversy, reentered the saloon and forcibly
detained Garner.
In the ensuing scuffle Garner was thrown
to the floor, handcuffed and removed from the saloon.
Curtis assumed custody of Garnpr and proceeded to
the Utah County Jail to incarcerate him, while Anderson
1. Garner was also taken to the Utah Valley Hospital for an
examination and x-rays of his shoulder and elbow which he
allegedSponsored
wereby theinjured
in the scuffle.
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returned to the saloon in search of the "bouucec" l\pplea:.,
After finding Applegate there, l\nderso11 rcscorted hin 1 .tc;r
the highway to Brackenbury's trailer, whict1 was also llS•;·J"
the Justice Court of Soldiers Swnmit.
Once inside the trailer, Anderson declared Appl::gate was under arre::!t for interfering with an oflicer in r
course of his duty,
and Brackenbury proclaimed the Justi·
Court to be in session.
According to the testimony of
AJ?pl~gate, _An~erson then proceedeg to physically intimidn
him into signing false statements concerning the prior
activities in the bar.
The first two statements concerneG
Garner striking Anderson and Applegate's purchase from
ca:ner of liquor' "over the bar' II ~n the J & M Sa~oon. Th: I
third statement recounted the details of the earlier incid,,
in the bar and the arrest of Garner.
Applegate testified:·.:
signed the false sta t4men ts because he was scared of possible further violence.
Applegate' s account of the incident in the trail/
was corroborated by the testimony of Curtis.
Curtis testified that upon returning to Soldiers Summit, after deliver2.
See State v. Bradsha1V, Utah, 541 P.2d 800 (1975) (whee'
we held 76-8-305, interfering with a
• law enforceme"'
official, unconstitutional.)
3.
Applegate explained:
"A.
He (Anderson) grablJed me by my shirt and he said
'Yes, you did it.
You seen him strike me,' and picked~.-:
and he tore my shirt across, like that.
(Indicating)
Q.
What do you mean he picked you up?
A.
Picked me up by my shirt, raised me up out of th:!
chair.
Q. All right, when he picked you up did he say uy~
to you?
A.
He said, "Let me show you some judo, or somethir,:
or another; and he put his leg out and he pushed me o~r
leg backwards. '
Q. What happened to you?
A.
I hit the floor on my back.
Q.
And while you were lying on the floor what happ:r
A.
He picked me back up.
Q.
How?
A.
The same way, with my shirt.
Q.
Did he say anything to you while he was doing:
A.
He called me a cotton picking dink.
Q. Did he call you anything else?
A.
When he picked me up he called me a
he ~ 1
1
that
he said, 'I could kill you with my bare hands,
fat - - an cl - - • ' "
4.
When asked why he did not defend himself from Andct"
1
attack, Applegate explained:
"Because I was scared; Fr
identified himself in the bar as the Chief of Police,
was in a court of law, and I couldn't see fighting ba·.·'
court of law.
Didn't seem lil~e the right thing to do·
1
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ing Garner, he initiated a conversation with Anderson in
which the former explained how he had procured a sworn
statement from Applegate concerning the sale of liquor "over
the bar" by Garner. When Curtis asked Anderson if the statement was made voluntarily Anderson replied, "Well, I had to
rough bim (Applegate) up a little bit, but I got the statement. fl0
Subsequently, the defendants were arrested for the
crim6 of tampering with a witness in violation of 76-8508.
The defendants appeared at their arraignment and
requested a preliminary hearing. This request was granted
and Anderson and Brackenbury were released on their own
recognizance.
At the preliminary hearing Garner and Curtis were
presented as witnesses for the prosecution. However,
instead of presenting Applegate at the preliminary examination, the prosecution moved to introduce Applegate's sworn
affidavit relating the essence of his testimony. The prosecution explained Applegate would be present at the trial to
testify, but they reasoned the inconvenience of bringing him
from his home in Muskogee, Oklahoma, to Utah rendered his
absence at the preliminary examination permissible and the
adm~ssion of his sworn affidavit justified under 77-1519.
The judge agreed with the prosecution's contentions
5. Curtis also testified that Brackenbury, who was present
at the conversation between Anderson and Curtis, stated that
Anderson had roughed Applegate up "pretty good."
6. 76-8-508. Tampering with witness - • • • A person is
guilty of a felony of the third degree if:
"(l) Believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to
induce or otherwise cause a person to:
"(a) Testify or inform falsely; or •
"
7. The Amendment to 77-15-19 states:
"(2) The rules of evidence for trial of criminal cases
shall apply at the preliminary examination, except that hearsay evidence that would not be admissible at trial shall be
admitted if the court determines that it would impose an unreasonable burden on one of the parties or on a witness to
require that the primary source of the evidence be produced at
the hearing, and if the witness or party furnishes information
bearing on the informant's reliability and, as far as possible,
the means by which the information was obtained. When hearsay evidence is admitted, the court, in determining the
existence of sufficient cause, shall consider:
"(a) Tlle extent to which the hearsay quality of the
evidence affects the weight it should be given, and
"(b) T'le likelihood of evidence other than hearsay
being available at trial to provide the information furnished by
lwarsay at the preliminary examination."
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and allowed, over the objection o[ the def<'rtdant, the i1itc
duction of the atfidavit into evidence.
The judge fol!nd
the evidence presented at the preliminary examLnation sufficient to bind the matter over to the District Court for
trial.
At the subsequent trial, the defendants were convir·t
by a jury of the crime as charged.
The defendants' principal issue on appeal concerr,c
the constitutionality of the procedure employed at the preliminary hearing.
Interpreting the recently enacted amendrr
to 77-15-19 which allows the use of hearsay evidence at the
preliminary hearing, the examining judge allowed the prosecution to introduce the sworn affidavit of its principal wi tnc
Applegate.
The defendants con tend the use of this affidavit '
in lieu of the personal appearance of Applegate at the exami:.•
tion, abridged their constitutional right to be confront3ct
by the witnesses against them in a criminal prosecution.
This issue, presents important questions of first impression i
to this Court concerning the application of the procedural
safeguards embodied in Article I, Section 12, of the Utah
Constitution to the preliminary examination.
.-.

1

1

Article I, Section 12, outlines the protections
guaranteed an individual in the course of a criminal pros~
cution.
It provides:
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to
demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf,
to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to
appeal in all cases.
In no instance
shall any accused person, before final
8.
The defendants contend the curtailment of their constitutional and statutory right to cross-examine a material
witness constitutes a denial of their right to a preliminar:
examination. See Article I, Section 13, Utah ConstitutiooPursuant to 77-15-10 the defendants have a statutory right
to have witnesses at the preliminary hearing cross-examine]
in their behalf.
However, the necessity of the prosecuti~
presenting a specific witness at the hearing in lieu oft~·
introduction of an affidavit of his testimony lies outside
the iscope of this statutory provision, and depends, rather
on the constitutional protections afforded nll criminal
defendants.
While we agree the procedure employed abrid['."
these protections it did not deprive the defendants of a
preliminary hearing in this particular case.
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judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not he
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a
husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense."
.
. The preliminary examina~ion of a person ac§used of
a crime in Utah is part of the criminal prosecution.
Therefore, a strict reading of the language of Section 12
would provide the accused the entire panoply of guaranteed
rights at the preliminary examination. However, the allocation of the various protections afforded by Section 12 is
not dependent solely upon a strict interpretation of that
section.
Rather, the application of the various protections embodied in Section 12 to the several stages of a
criminal prosecution is defined by the relationship between
the specific proceedings and the protection off erect by the
procedural safeguard. Only when the specific safeguard is
necessary to effectuate the protection of a substantive
right held by the accused will its application to the specific criminal proceeding be mandated.
Therefore, before we will grant the accused a
constitutional right of confrontation at the preliminary
examination, we must examine the nature and purpose of that
proceeding and determine i· confrontation is necessary to
insure the protection of a~y substantive rights of the
accused.
Preliminary examinations in Utah are adversarial
proceedings in which the prosecution must present evidence
9.
The inclusion of provisions concerning preliminary
examinations in Utah's territorial laws evidences the importance of hearings in the state's criminal procedure. See
Compiled Laws of Utah (territory), Vol. II, Chapter VII,
Section 4872-4896 (1888).
These provisions were incorporated into the State's early laws and some sections have
remained unaltered to the present time.
See Revised Statutes,
Utah, Chapter 16, Section 4666 (1898); Compiled Laws, id.,
Section 4878, s. 99; compare 77-15-10. To characterize the
preliminary examination as outside the scope of the "criminal
prosecution" belies this heritage and the recognized importance of this proceeding.
Cf., State v. Freedman, 93 Utah
125, 71 P.2d 196 (1937); Thus, in Utah, as in Alabama, the
preliminary hearing represents a critical stage in the
criminal process and a part of the criminal prosecution.
See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 26 L.Ed2d 387, 90 S.Ct.
1999,

(1969).
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sufficient to establish; (a) that a public offense ha::; beeri
committed, and ft)) sufficient cause to believe the dRfendari'
guilty thereof.
The probable cause showing necessary in the pre1 iminary examination differs from that required for an
arrest warrant.
In the l:itter, the facts presented r:iust b2
sufficient to establish that an offense has lJeen comr.iitted
and a reasonable belief the defendant committed it.
The
facts presented, however, do not ~fve to establish a pri~
facie case against the defendant.
Conversely the probable cause showing at the preliminary examination must establish a prima facie case
against the defendant from which the trier of fact could
conclude the defendant was guilty of the offense as charged.:!
The prosecution is not required to introduce
enough evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond' •
reasonable doubt, but must present a quantum of evidence
/
suffip~ent to warrant submission of the case to the f~iffoc
1
fact.
Also, the determination of sufficient cause
to /
bind the accused over for trial must be based on facts
which are proved at the examination and may not depend on /
the information, complaint or dpgosi tions taken before the 1
issuance of the arrest warrant. ·
While the burden falls upon the prosecution to
establish sufficient cause to believe the accused guiltyo
the crime charged, the adversarial qualities of the exami••:·
tion allow the defendant an opportunity to attack the pro;•
tion's evidence and to present any affirmative defenses.
Al though the hearing is not a trial per se, it is not an r
parte proceeding nor one-sided determination of probable
10.
See United States v. Eldredge, 5 Utah 161, 13 P. 67;
appeal dismissed, 145 U.S. 636, 36 L. Ed. 857 ( 1887), 12
s.ct. 980, (1887); cf. 77-15-17.
11.
See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 3 L.Ed.2~
327, 79 S.Ct. 329, (1959).
The finding of probable caus 2
in the context of an arrest warrant usually rests excl~
sively on hearsay evidence.
12.
Eldredge, supra note 10, at 676; see also :1lyers 1"
Corrmonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 298 N.E.2d 819 (1973). In
~lyers the Supreme Judicial Court of Hassachusetts adopt
"directed verdict" rule in defining the minimum quantu~•
evidence necessary to fulfill the probable cause requir,
at the preliminary examination.
The court explained, ".
the mag is tr ate should dismiss the complaint when, on U'
evidence presen tee!, a trial court would be bound to ac:
as a matter of law." at 824.
13.
Thus, the minimum quantum of evidence is more tii:':
required to establish probable cause for arrest but 12
would prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonabl~"
14.
See 77-15-17.
15.
Eldredge, supra note 10, at 676.
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cause,
and the accused is granted a stf~utory right to
cross-examine the witnesses against him,
and ~he right to
subpoena and present witnesses in his defense. 1
Thus, the
preliminary examination is an adversarial proceeding in
which certain procedural safeguards are recognized as necessary to guar~ntee the accused's substantive right to a
fair hearing.
The fundamental purpose served by the preliminary
examination is the 2 6erretting out o~ groundless and improvident prosecutions.
The effectuation of this primary
16. See Jennings v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County,
59 Cal.Rptr. 440, 428 P.2d 304 (1967).
17. See supra note 8.
18. 77-15-8; 77-15-11; See also State v. McGee, 24 Utah 2d
396, 473 P.2d 388 (1970).
19. See Myers v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, at 826.
There the court explained:
"In some cases, the evidence
introduced in behalf of the defendant will do no more than
raise a conflict which can best be resolved by a jury at the
actual trial where the Commonwealth must prove the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But, in other cases, the
evidence elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination or
from the testimony of defense witnesses or from other evidence may lead the examining magistrate to disbelieve the
prosecution's witnesses a.nd discharge the defendant for lack
of probable cause."
[Footnote omitted]
20. See Coleman v. Alabama, supra note 9; People ex rel.
Leidner v. District Court, Colo., 597 P.2d 1040 (1979).
Reference to the historical foundation of the modern preliminary examination illustrates this primary purpose of
ferretting out unwarranted and improvident prosecutions.
In
1554 the English Parliament enacted a statute granting
certain persons accused of crimes the right of an examination before a Justice of the Peace.
(1 and 2 - Phillip and
Mary, Chapters XIII, 1554). However, the right was limited
to persons accused of crimes subject to bail or mainprise.
The following year in what Blackstone (Volume IV, page 296),
referred to as the basis of the modern preliminary hearing,
the English parliament extended the previous right to a pretrial examination to individuals accused of non-bailable
cri1:ies.
(2 and 3 Phillip and \!ary, Chapter X, 1555). In
extending the protection embodied in the examination the
parliament recognized: "And for as much as t11e said act (of
1554) doth not extend to such prisoners as shall be brought
before any justice of peace for manslaughter or felony, and
by such justice shall be committed to ward for the suspicion
of such manslaughter or felony, and not bailed, in which
case the examination of such prisoners, and of such as shall
bring him, is as necessary, or rather more than where such
prisoner shall he let to bail or mainprise • • . " [as quoted
in Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa.S. 382, 124 A.2d 666,
670 (1056).] The protection afforded the accused by the
(Continued next page)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

No. 16372

(

(

purpose relieves the accused from the substantial degradation and expense incident to a 1:ioc!ern ccimi.na l trial when
the charges against him are unwarranted or the evidence
insufficient. Therefore, the grave injustice suffered by
the defendant in an unwarranted prosecution may be eliminated by the efficient administration 6f the preliminary
examination. This, also, demands the application of certah
basic procedural safeguards to that proceeding.
Several ancillary purposes supplement the primary
purpose of the hearing;
The examination provides a means of
effectively advising the ~efendant of the nature of the
2
accusations against him.
The hearing also provides a
discovery device in which the defendant is not only informed
of the nature of the State's case against him, but is provided a means ~2 which he can discover and preserve favorable evidence.
The discovery available at the preliminary hear~·
represents an important step in the preparati2~ of the
defendant's defense for the subsequent trial.
The opportunity to prepare an effective defense is recognized as
essential to the preservati2~ of the defendant's substantive right to a fair trial.
Thus, here again, effectuatio· I
0

(Footnote No. 20 continued)
examination is the right not to be imprisoned and held to
answer at trial under a malicious or ur1,·1arranted prosecution.
This is reflected in the procedure of the early
examinations where as explained by Blackstone:
"The justice'
before whom such prisoner is brought is bound immediately t0,
examine the circumstances of the crime alleged * * * i f upo, i
this inquiry it manifestly appears that either no such cri~2'
was committed or that the suspicions entertained of the
prisoner was wholly groundless in such case only is it
lawful to totally discharge him."
(O'Brien, id., at 671).
21. See State v. Nelson, 52 Utah 617, 176 P. 860 (1918).
22.
See Lataille v. District Court of Eastern Hampden,
366 Mass. 525, 320 N.E.2d 877 (1974).
23. The importance of the ancillary discovery attendant~
the preliminary hearing is moderated by the existence of
other discovery devices avail;i,ble to the defendant. Thus,
in Colorado where an extensive procedural panoply of discovery devices is granted the criminal defendant the di~
covery incident to the preliminary hearing is relatively
unirnportant.
See Rex v. Sullivan, 194 Colo. 568, 575 P.2i
408

(1978).

24.
See State v. Jensen, 34 Utah 166, 169, 96 P. 1085, (!'
In Jensen this Court explained:
"The purpose of this pro 1
sion of the Constitution [Article I, Section 13] is to
secure to the accused before he is brought to trial uade:·
information, the right to be actvisect of the nature of the
accusation against him and to be con Eron ted with and give
an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses testifying on
behalf of the state.
Ile is thus 1_•:1abled, if he so des in
to fully inform himself of the facts upon which the statr
(Continued
next page)
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of the ancillary purposes of the preliminary hearing mand:i tcs the application of certain procedural safeguards to
the hearing itself.
Our review of the nature and purpose of the preliminary examination illustrates the critical character of
the proceeding in relation to various substantive rights of
the defendant which are subject to infringement by the
exclusion of certain proc2gural safeguards at this step in
the criminal prosecution.
Recognizing the "critical" character of this
proceeding the Supreme Court has extended the right of
counsel (as embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Feder~$
Constitution) to an indigent at the preliminary hearing.
Similarly the California Supreme Court has granted the
accused the right to compel the attendance
witnesses for
his defense at the preliminary examination.~
The protections afforded by the right of confrontation at the
preliminary examination are equally important and so interrelated to the right t2 effective counsel and the presentation of a defense 8 that they must be guaranteed the

97

(Footnote No. 24 continued)
relies to sustain the charge made against him, and be prepared to meet them at the trial." at 1086.
25.
In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L.Ed.2d
1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926, (1967), the United States Supreme Court
recognized the protections embodied in the Sixth Amendment
(which are echoed in Article I, Section 12, of the Utah
Constitution) apply to "critical" stages of the proceeding " • • • where the results might well settle the accused's fate
and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality."
(at
225).
In Coleman v. Alabama, supra note 9, at 9, the Court
clarified this terminology by explaining, "The determination
whether the (preliminary) hearing is a 'critical stage'
. depends, as noted, upon an analysis 'whether potential
substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inhere in the
. confrontation
'"
26.
See Coleman v. Alabama, supra note 9, at 9.
("Plainly
the guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary hearing is
essential to protect the indigent accused against an erroneous or improper prosecution.")
27.
See Jennings, supra note 16.
28.
The crucial interrelationship between confrontation
and the assistance of counsel and the preparation of a
defense was implicitly recognized in Coleman v. Alabama,
supra note 9, at 9, where the Court delineated the nature
of the protection afforded by the guiding hand of counsel,
by explaining, "First, the lawyer's skilled examination and
cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses
in the State's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse
(Continued next page)
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accused at the preliminary hearing.
Classically, the primary object of the constitutional right of confrontation is to prevent depositions a"''
ex parte affidav.i ts from being used against the accused at
trial in lieu of a personal examination and cross-ex:.unination of the witness against him.
\'/hen confrontation is a\',
able the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing th.
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but
of compelling him to stand face-to-face with the jury in
,
order that they may look at him and judge by his demeanor
and the manner in ~hich he gives his testimony whether he is
worthy of belief.
Encompassed in this right of 5onfronta- !
tion is the procedural right of cross-examination 3 and the/,
recognition of certain procedural rights regarding the
,
exclusion of extra judicial statements, similar to those
fo~nd pro3Icted by evidentiary rules excluding hearsay
evidence.
1

2

I

The adversarial nature of the preliminary hearing [
is conducive to the imposition of these procedural safeguards.
The application of the right of cross-examinati~,
and the exclusion of· certain out of court statements at tl:i'
stage of the criminal prosecution insures essential protection of the defendant's substantive rights.
Specifically, the cross-examination of witnesses
presenting testimony against the accused at the hearing
(Footnote No. 28 continued).
to bind the accused over.
Second, in any event, the skill:
interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can
fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-exarnin~
tion of the State's witnesses at the trial, or preserve
testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does
not app?ar at the trial.
Third, trained counsel can r:iore
effectively discover the case the State has against his
client and r.iake possible the preparation of a proper defer.:
to meet that case at the trial."
29.
See '.!attox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 39 L.Ed.
409, 15 S.C. 337, (1894).
See also, State v. Uannion, 19
Utah 505, 57 P. 542 (1899).
30.
See State v. King, 24 Utah 482, 68 P. 418 (1902).
31.
However, the Supreme Court of the United States poi:·
out in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 26 L.Ed.2d 489,,
90 S.Ct. 1930 (1970) that the confrontation clause is no'./
cons ti tutionaliza ti on of eviden tiary rules concerning he,':
and while protecting similar values the decisions of the
Supreme Court have never established a total congruence
between the two.
Thus, introduction of certain evidence
could fall within an accepted exception to the hearsay
rules and, yet, contravene the accused's constitutional
rights
ofQuinney
confrontation.
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'
provirl("c' a means of attacking their credibility and thus the
of their testimony.
In a proceeding such as
the preliminary examination, where the credibility of the
witnesses is an 3 ~mportant element in the determination of
probable cause,
the recogn1t1on of a procedural right of
cross-examination is essential to the preservation of a fair
hearing.
The introduction of certain material testimony,
albeit under the hearsay exemption granted by 77-15-19,
would seriously curtail the defendants ability to present an
affirmative defense at the preliminary hearing by denying
him the protections provided by the confrontation of witnesses against him.
,~ubst:lrlce

If the preliminary examination is to retain any
meaningful significance in the criminal prosecution and
provide an effective means of weeding out improvident prosecutions, the protections attendant the defendant's right to.
present an affirmative defense cannot be circumvented by
allowing the prosecution t~ base its showing of probable
cause on hearsay evidence. 3 Therefore, the trial court's
interpretation of 77-15-19, which allowed the prosecution to
present the testimony of a material witness via an extra
judicium affidavit, cannot be accepted.
Additionally, the ancillary benefits inherent in
this preliminary proceeding, e.g., the various aspects of
discovery incident to the pretrial examination of prosecution witnesses, would be seriously curtailed by denying the
defendant a right of confrontation at the hearing. This
curtailment would infringe upon the defendant's right to a
fair trial, by denying him the opportunity Lo prepare an
effective defense.
For example, the cross-examination of witnesses at
this preliminary stage in a criminal prosecution provides
the defendant an opportunity to attack their testimony
before it becomes immutable by repetition and the influence, however legitimate, of the prosecution.
Also,
favorable testimony will often be elicited from the crossexamination of the witnesses at the preliminary examination
32.
See Myers, supra note 12, at 826.
33. Cf. Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
("The right to counsel which Coleman declared would amount
to no more than a pious overture unless it is a right to
counsel able to function efficaciously in his client's
behalf." at 1205); Analogous to this reasoning is the
conclusion that the extensive use of hearsay evidence at
grand jury proceedinRS tends to destroy the protection from
Urtl'.'arranted prosecutior1s that grand juries are supposed to
afford the innocent.
See United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d
725 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 386 U.S. 940, 17 L.Ed.2d
872, 87 S.Ct. 975, appeal dismLssed, 389 U.S. 80, 19 L.Ed.2d
255, 88 S.Ct. 253, reh. denied, 389 U.S. 1025, 19 L.Ed.2d
fi75, gg S.Ct. 583 (1967).
See also United States v. Hubbard,
GOJ f.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1979).
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(

and contradictory statements m:ccle at the hear.ing may subsequently become important as toCJls for attack~~g the crerlibility of the witnesses at the actual trial.·
However, recognition of the right of confrontat 1 ,r
at the preliminary examination does not change the charact·"·
of that proceeding.
It must still retain its preliminary
nature and is not to be considered a full trial on the
merits.
The prosecution is not required to introduce its
entire case at the hearing but, rather, need only introduce
that quantum of evidence necessary to surmount their burd~
of proving probable cause.
The recognition of the right 0 1
confrontation at the preliminary examination merely demaa~
the prosecution's use of hearsay evidence at the hearing~·
not circumvent the defendant's substantive rights to a fair.
hearing and a fair trial, by denying the defendant an
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who offer testi~"
at the hearing.

,

1

We must turn now to determine the effect of this
holding in the present case.
Al though the judge's in terpretation of the statute and his acceptance of the hearsay
evidence constitute error, that error was not prejudicial 1
to the defendants.
Rather, in this case, the error was
/
rendered harmless by the testimony of the other witnessesr'
the hearing.
Their testimony, when considered in conjunct1'
with the copies of the false sta ternen ts signed by Applegat·
which were presented at the hearing, was sufficient to
surmount the prosecution's burden and establish sufficient
cause to bind the matter over to trial.
The introductioo ·
the sworn affidavit of Apple~~a te was in actuality favorable,
to the defendants because it provided additional discoven
and possible impeachment evider1ce.
Thus, the character of
the error and the defendants' failure to prove any significant prejudice denie~ a reversal of the present conviction based upon it.· 5

I

The conviction of Brackenbury, however, must~
overturned, because of the immunity granted to him priort
trial.
Under the powers vested in the prosecuting attorM
by 77-45-21, he solicited pre-trial testimony from Brae~·
bury by granting;
"
• • immunity only to the incident
relating to the bar and to James Garner and to his [Brar~
bury) activities as Justice of the Peace in relation to
arrests and the people brought before him."
Applegate's testimony at trial indicated he wa'
under arrest at the time of the incident, and the Justic•'
Court of Soldiers Summit was declared in session by Brae'"
bury before Applegate was intimidated into signing the

34.
35.

California v. Green, supra note 31.
See Stnte v. Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 419 P.2cl TiC
(1066); State v. Lihbey, 224 Or. 431, 356 P.2d lGl (l~iGO
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staternents in question.
Therefore, the present prosecution
falls within the 3 ~cope of immunity granted by the prosecut1np; attorney.
While we believe justice requires the vacation of
Drackenbury's conviction, we in no way condone his actions.
!!is conduct is severely censured. The Justice of the Peace
Association should investigate such activity.
Because of our application of Article I, Section
12 of the Utah Constitution, we need not consider the
appellants' federal constitutional claims. After thorough
consideration of the other points presented on appeal, we
conclude they are without merit.
WE CONCUR:
D. Frank Wilkins, Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

36.
See State v. Ward, Utah, 571 P.2d 1343, 1347 (1977)
[Wilkins dissent]. The state may not claim any benefit from
the ambiguous nature of the prosecuting attorney's grant of
immunity, and any questions of interpretation must be resolved in favor of the defendant.

CROCKETT, Chief Justice:

(Concurring in result, with comments.)

I concur in the result of the main opinion, but
feel impelled to make some observations.

1e

~

a:

1

'"

According to my understanding of the opinion, its
import is that if Sectio11 77-15-19, U.C.A. is applied iu
accordance with its terns, by adoitting evidence by hearsay or
by affidavit, it is in violation of constitutional safeguards.
With this I cannot agree.
The statute impresses me as being
carefully and advisedly drawn, with adequate protections for
the rights of an accused, and of the public; and that it is
therefore fair and constitutional if properly applied.
It is also pertinent to observe that the courts
should not reach out and hold a statute unconstitutional in
the n.bstract, hut should do so only if it is in violation of
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(
the constitutional rights of the pr~rson cor"pl:tLning. 1 'I~e
main opinion itself propt'rly points out that what wa'; dor,,,
in applying Section 77-15-19 in thic; case rr•sultecl i 11 no
prejudice to the defendants.
I am therefor<' unable to see
justification or purpos2 in attacking either that statute ur
its application herein.
I agree that the grant of irnmun i ty by the county 1'
attorney to defendant Brackenbury is fairly understood to
include what was done with respect to the prospective witness'
Applegate; and that the charge against him should be disrnissJ

·1
I

1.
Baird v. State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713 (1978).
2.
That when the court determines that a statute does not
apµly in a case, it should not go further and consider its
validity, see 3 Am. Jur. 383; Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d
368, 374 P.2d 839 (1962); State v. Granato, Utah,_ P.2d
~- (#16365, decided April 11, 1980).

I

HALL, Justice:

r'

(Concurring in result)

I

I concur in the disposition of the appeal, but
.
reserve judgment on the constitutional issue discussed in thf'
main S_>Pinion since it is not es sen ti al to the decision in th
case.

1.
See Hoyle v. \lonson, Utah, 606 P.2d 240 (1980), seeals
Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368, 378 P.2d 839 (1966).

I

I
I,
I

I
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